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COMMENT

Flores-Figueroa and the Search for Plain
Meaning in Identity Theft Law
NATHANIEL J. STUHLMILLER†
Ignacio Flores-Figueroa, a citizen of Mexico working
illegally in the United States, was convicted of aggravated
identity theft in violation of 18 United States Code Section
1028A(a)(1).1 He appealed his conviction, eventually all the
way to the United States Supreme Court, which granted his
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari on October 20, 2008.2 The
issue in the case was how far the term “knowingly” in
§ 1028A(a)(1)3 should extend in a sentence.4 At stake was
whether or not the government had to prove that FloresFigueroa knew that the identification materials used in the
commission of a felony belonged to another person. While
the contested issue was small, merely an argument over the
grammatical interpretation of a single sentence, the
outcome was of vital importance to millions of illegal
immigrants living and working in the United States. If the
† J.D. Candidate, Class of 2010, University at Buffalo Law School, The State
University of New York; Member, Buffalo Law Review.
1. United States v. Flores-Figueroa, 274 F. App’x 501 (8th Cir. 2008), rev’d,
129 S. Ct. 1886 (2009). The original Eighth Circuit case is a short, two page
unpublished decision. This Comment, while in response to the Flores-Figueroa
case, will highlight the opinions from other similar cases that led up to the
decision in Flores-Figueroa and that were considered by the Supreme Court.
2. Flores-Figueroa v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 457 (2008).
3. 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(1) (2006).
4. Flores-Figueroa v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 1886, 1889 (2009).
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government had its way, it would be able to use §
1028A(a)(1) as a weapon to combat illegal immigrants who
misappropriated another’s identification. If the petitioner’s
interpretation was accepted, the statute would affect only
those who knowingly steal identification documents from a
known person, and many illegal immigrants using forged
identification documents for work purposes would be beyond
its reach.
This Comment on identity theft law will serve as an
introduction to the debate surrounding § 1028A(a)(1) and an
analysis of the Supreme Court’s recent decision in FloresFigueroa v. United States.5 Part I is an introduction, and it
recounts the story of a United States Immigration and
Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) raid on a slaughterhouse in
Iowa that unlawfully employed illegal immigrants.
Although this was the largest raid to date, similar tales play
themselves out in other cities and small towns across the
country. Part II provides a general overview of identity theft
and how it affects victims. Part III focuses on the Identity
Theft Penalty Enhancement Act,6 of which § 1028A(a)(1) is
a part. Part IV reviews the circuit court cases interpreting §
1028A(a)(1) and the Supreme Court’s decision in FloresFigueroa. Finally, Part V discusses the impact that the
decline in standards of grammar in society has on the
meaning of the Supreme Court’s “ordinary usage” analysis
of statutory text. It also analyzes the three different
approaches to statutory interpretation taken by the
opinions in Flores-Figueroa.
I. INTRODUCTION
As the helicopters circled overhead, Rosa, a forty-yearold mother of two from Mexico, knew that her American
dream had come to an end. Rosa had been employed at the
Agriprocessors Inc. slaughterhouse for the past fifteen
months and had lived in the United States illegally for the
past thirteen years, working a variety of jobs in small
Midwestern towns just like Postville, Iowa.7 But today, as
5. Id.
6. Pub. L. No. 108-275, 118 Stat. 831 (2004) (codified in scattered sections of
18, 28 U.S.C.).
7. See Joe Friesen, Hardening the Line on Illegal Workers: Largest
Immigration Raid in U.S. History Highlights Enduring Tensions over Who
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shouts of “la migra,” a Spanish term for immigration agents,
echoed across the slaughterhouse floor and she hid among
frozen chickens in an industrial sized freezer, her worst
fears would finally be realized as the ICE agent tapped her
on the shoulder and asked her to come with him.8
Antonio Escobedo was also at the plant that day. When
he saw the choppers circling overhead, he immediately
thought of his wife, who also worked at the plant.9 Escobedo
found his wife and “[t]he couple hid for hours inside the
plant before obtaining refuge in the pews and hall at St.
Bridget’s Catholic Church, where hundreds of other
Guatemalan and Mexican families gathered, hoping to avoid
arrest.”10 Like Rosa, Escobedo and his wife would also be
arrested by ICE agents that day.11 Afterwards, he would
say, “I like my job. I like my work. I like it here in Iowa,”
and would wonder, “[a]re they mad because I’m working?”12
The ICE raid on the Agriprocessors plant in Postville in
2008 was the culmination of a sixteen-month investigation
and was “the largest criminal enforcement operation ever
carried out by immigration authorities at a workplace.”13
The raid began at ten in the morning with “helicopters,
buses and vans encircling the western edge of town . . .
[and] [w]itnesses said hundreds of agents surrounded the
plant in 10 minutes, [then] began interviewing workers and
seized company records.”14 In total, 389 illegal immigrants
were arrested that day, including “290 Guatemalans, 93
Mexicans, two Israelis and four Ukrainians, according to
the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Northern District of
Iowa.”15 Documents later filed in court would allege that “a
Deserves a Place in American Society, GLOBE & MAIL (Toronto), May 24, 2008, at
A18.
8. See Friesen, supra note 7.
9. Spencer S. Hsu, Raid on Kosher Plant Rattles Iowa Town: 389
Immigrants Arrested; 600 Children Absent from School, ST. PAUL PIONEER
PRESS, May 18, 2008, at A6.
10. Id.
11. See Friesen, supra note 7; Hsu, supra note 9.
12. Hsu, supra note 9.
13. Julia Preston, 270 Immigrants Sent to Prison in Federal Push, N.Y.
TIMES, May 24, 2008, at A1.
14. Hsu, supra note 9.
15. Id.
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search of social security numbers in late 2007 showed that
more than 75 per cent of the nearly 1,000 Agriprocessors
employees were using false documents.”16 Looking back on
that day, Matt Dummermuth, the U.S. Attorney for
Northern District of Iowa, would call the operation an
“astonishing success.”17
But for those arrested that day and for the town they
once called home, things would never be the same. In a
single day, more than ten percent of the town’s 2,300
residents had been arrested.18 The day after the raid “[h]alf
of the school district’s 600 students were absent[,] . . .
including 90 percent of Hispanic children, because their
parents were arrested or in hiding.”19 David Strudthoff,
Postville Community Schools superintendent, said that
what had happened to the town was “‘like a natural
disaster—only this one is manmade.’”20 Mr. Strudthoff went
on to say, “[t]hese people have been here 15 years and
they’re entwined in our families and in our community. . . .
When 10 per cent of the population is imprisoned, it brings
a community to its knees.”21 A man named Aurelio, an
illegal immigrant who worked at the plant but was not
working the day of the raid, had “[s]ix of his siblings . . .
caught in the raid,” and compared the day’s events to “‘an
earthquake in [his] life.’”22
The illegal immigrants arrested at the plant were
“herded onto buses and interned at the National Cattle
Congress Fairgrounds, [seventy-five miles] away in
Waterloo,” and “[t]hey were kept there in a makeshift camp,
behind a chain-link fence, watched by armed immigration
officers.”23 The criminal proceedings were “unusually swift,”
and “297 immigrants pleaded guilty and were sentenced in
four days,” drawing criticism from the American

16. Friesen, supra note 7.
17. Preston, supra note 13.
18. Hsu, supra note 9.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21 Friesen, supra note 7.
22. Id.
23. Id.

2010]

FLORES-FIGUEROA

225

Immigration Lawyers Association about possible due
process violations.24
The illegal immigrants, most from Guatemala, filed into the
courtrooms in groups of 10, their hands and feet shackled. One
by one, they entered guilty pleas through a Spanish interpreter,
admitting they had taken jobs using fraudulent Social Security
cards or immigration documents. Moments later, they moved to
25
another courtroom for sentencing.

Most of the immigrants pled guilty and “agreed to
immediate deportation after they serve[d] five months in
prison.”26 The plea bargains were part of a deal offered by
the prosecutor in the case to avoid “felony identity theft
charges that carry a mandatory two-year minimum jail
sentence.”27 Not surprisingly, in order to work at the plant,
many of the immigrants used real Social Security cards and
visas that belonged to other people.28 The reason for the
guilty pleas is also not surprising; as one defendant put it:
“‘My family is worried in Guatemala. . . . I ask that you
deport us as soon as possible, that you do us that kindness
so we can be together again with our families.’”29
II. IDENTITY THEFT
Identity theft has been called the “crime of the new
millennium”30 and has been touted as the “‘fastest growing
crime in the United States.’”31 Identity theft comes in
24. See Preston, supra note 13.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(1) (2006) provides a mandatory two year
sentencing increase for anyone who knowingly uses another’s means of
identification during the commission of an enumerated felony, such as
fraudulent use of Social Security or immigration documents. See § 1028A(a)(1),
(c).
28. Preston, supra note 13.
29. Id.
30. See Sean B. Hoar, Identity Theft: The Crime of the New Millennium, 80
OR. L. REV. 1423, 1423 (2001).
31. Donncha Marron, ‘Alter Reality’ Governing the Risk of Identity Theft, 48
BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 20, 20 (2008) (quoting Michael W. Perl, It’s Not Always
About the Money, 94 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 169, 172 (2003)).
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different forms, but at its core it is “the misuse of another
individual’s personal information to commit fraud.”32 In
2005, the Federal Trade Commission estimated the total
losses from identity theft to businesses and consumers to be
at least $15.6 billion.33
According to the Presidential Identity Theft Taskforce,
identity theft has three basic stages in its “life cycle.”34 In
the first stage, “the identity thief attempts to acquire a
victim’s personal information.”35 The potential means of
acquisition are myriad and are limited only by the cunning
and determination of the thief. Some typical examples
include “low-tech methods,” such as “dumpster diving” or
stealing mail, wallets, or purses that contain personal
information, as well as “complex and high-tech frauds,” such
as computer hacking, Trojan viruses, or other malicious
computer programs.36 Thieves can work alone as scammers
or con artists, or as part of larger, more organized identity
theft rings. In one case, “28 people [were charged] with
participating in a fraud ring that supplied over 1,900
individuals with fraudulent Social Security cards. The cards
were supplied by a Social Security Administration clerk in
exchange for $70,000 in payoffs.”37 In 2006 alone, nearly
seventy-three million people had their personal records lost
or stolen and became potential identity theft victims.38
32. PRESIDENTIAL IDENTITY THEFT TASKFORCE, COMBATING IDENTITY THEFT: A
STRATEGIC PLAN 2 (2007) [hereinafter TASKFORCE REPORT], available at
http://idtheft.gov/reports/StrategicPlan.pdf.
33. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, 2006 IDENTITY THEFT SURVEY REPORT 9 (2007)
[hereinafter FTC SURVEY], available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2007/11/Sy
novateFinalReportIDTheft2006.pdf.
34. TASKFORCE REPORT, supra note 32, at 2.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. See H.R. REP. NO. 108-528 at 5 (2004), as reprinted in 2004 U.S.C.C.A.N.
779, 781. For some other notable examples of both small scale and large scale
identity theft, see Ronald Smothers, State Report to Outline Lapses In Security
at D.M.V. Offices, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7, 2002, at A28, who reports that “corrupt
clerks working [at the D.M.V.] have become a vital link in schemes to sell illegal
identification documents”; and Brad Stone, 11 Charged in Theft of 41 Million
Card Numbers, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6, 2008, at C1, who writes that “Federal
prosecutors have charged 11 people with stealing more than 41 million credit
and debit card numbers, cracking what officials said on Tuesday appeared to be
the largest hacking and identity theft ring ever exposed.”
38. TASKFORCE REPORT, supra note 32, at 3.
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The second stage of identity theft occurs when “the thief
attempts to misuse the information he has acquired” either
by selling it to others or by using it himself.39 The misuse of
this information usually occurs in one of three main ways:
existing account fraud, new account fraud, and non-account
identity theft.40 Existing account fraud occurs when the thief
uses stolen information to access a victim’s existing
financial accounts. This includes, for example, using a
victim’s credit card to make fraudulent purchases or using a
victim’s debit card and pin number to withdraw funds from
the victim’s bank account.41 New account fraud occurs when
a thief uses a victim’s stolen information to open a new
account, for example using Social Security numbers, birth
dates, and home addresses to open bank accounts or apply
for new credit cards.42 Existing account fraud tends to occur
more frequently than new account fraud, but new account
fraud has the potential to be more costly to victims in terms
of financial liabilities and damage to credit ratings because
it is harder to detect.43 According to the Federal Trade
Commission, 6.5 million Americans were victims of existing
account fraud and 1.8 million Americans were victims of
new account fraud in 2005.44
Non-account identity theft is the use of “stolen personal
information to obtain government, medical, or other benefits
to which the criminal is not entitled.”45 Typical examples of
non-account identity theft include immigration fraud, where
illegal immigrants use Social Security numbers and
passports to enter the country, employment fraud, where
illegal immigrants, such as Flores-Figueroa and the other
defendants who are the subject of this comment, use Social
39. Id.
40. See id.
41. See id.
42. See id.
43. See id. at 11; see FTC SURVEY, supra note 33, at 23. According to the
Federal Trade Commission, 66% of existing account frauds are discovered
within one month of the initial misuse, while 38% of new account frauds are
discovered within one month. Id. Additionally, 24% of new account frauds went
undiscovered for six months or more, while only 3% of existing account frauds
went undetected over the same period. Id.
44. FTC SURVEY, supra note 33, at 3.
45. TASKFORCE REPORT, supra note 32, at 3.
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Security numbers and other information to obtain
employment, and medical identity theft, where stolen
information is used to obtain medical treatment.46 Nonaccount identity theft in the immigration and employment
context is different from the other types of identity theft
because the motive of those misusing the information is
often not to inflict financial harm on their victims, but
rather the goal is to “us[e] fraudulent Social Security
numbers to conduct their daily lives.”47 According to the
Federal Trade Commission, twenty percent of total identity
theft victims reported that their information was used in
non-account identity theft.48
Finally, in the third stage of identity theft, “an identity
thief has completed his crime and is enjoying the benefits,
while the victim is realizing the harm.”49 The victim often
first learns about the theft from “being denied credit or
employment, or being contacted by a debt collector seeking
payment for a debt the victim did not incur.”50 Often in
employment fraud cases, victims, such as the true owner of
the information Flores-Figueroa used to obtain employment,
learn of the theft when they “receive[ ] letters from the
Internal Revenue Service demanding back taxes for income
they had not reported because it was earned by someone
working under their name.”51 Still other victims learn of the
theft after being “denied driver’s licenses, credit or even
medical services because someone had improperly used
their personal information before.”52 The time it takes for a
theft to be discovered varies depending on the type of
46. See id. at 20.
47. See John Leland, Some ID Theft is Not for Profit, But to Get a Job, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 4, 2006, at A1. In at least one way, American taxpayers are
indirectly benefited by employment identity fraud, as “[t]he Social Security
Administration each year receives eight million to nine million earnings reports
from the Internal Revenue Service filed under names that do not match the
Social Security numbers.” Id. These mismatches provide a “boon to the Social
Security trust fund, [and i]n the 1990’s, such mismatches accounted for around
$20 billion in Social Security taxes paid.” Id.
48. FTC SURVEY, supra note 33, at 62.
49. TASKFORCE REPORT, supra note 32, at 3.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 20.
52. Id.
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misuse,53 and victims tend to experience problems and
financial repercussions long after the initial discovery of the
theft.54
According to the Federal Trade Commission, existing
account identity thieves in 2005 typically obtained $350 to
$457 from their victims, with individual victims reporting
losses as high as $6000 to $7000.55 New account identity
thieves typically obtained $1350 from their fraudulent use
of a victim’s information, with reports of individual cases of
thieves obtaining as much as $15,000 to $30,000 from their
crimes.56 Typically out of pocket expenses to victims are low,
but there have been reported cases of expenses ranging
from $1200 to $5000.57 Additionally, victims of identity
theft must spend time and effort restoring their identity
and experience a wide variety of associated problems as
well.58 Typical problems associated with identity theft
include “being harassed by collections agents, being denied
new credit, being unable to use existing credit cards, being
unable to obtain loans, having their utilities cut off, being
subject to a criminal investigation or civil suit, being
arrested, and having difficulties obtaining or accessing bank
accounts.”59 Thus, while it may be true that non-account
identity thieves, such as Flores-Figueroa, are merely using
the stolen information to conduct their daily lives, their
actions still have very real consequences for their victims.

53. See statistics, supra note 43.
54. See TASKFORCE REPORT, supra note 32, at 11-12.
55. FTC REPORT, supra note 33, at 5.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 6; TASKFORCE REPORT, supra note 32, at 11. Costs to victims are
usually low because an individual’s liability for fraudulent credit card charges
(one of the most prevalent forms of ID theft) is limited to $50, and most, if not
all, of the major carriers typically waive this charge. See Electronic Privacy
Information Center, Identity Theft: Understanding the Causes of Identity Theft,
http://epic.org/privacy/idtheft/ (last visited Dec. 6, 2009) [hereinafter EPIC].
58. See FTC SURVEY, supra note 33, at 6-7 (“The median value for the number
of hours spent resolving problems by all victims was 4. However, 10 percent of
all victims spent at least 55 hours resolving their problems. The top 5 percent of
victims spent at least 130 hours.”).
59. Id. at 7.
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III. THE STATUTE: 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(A)(1)
To address the growing “national crisis” of identity
theft, 60 Congress amended or enacted a number of statutes
designed to target the practice in the late 1990s and the
early 2000s.61 The statutes “provide[] an expansive
definition of identity theft. . . . [that] includes the misuse of
any identifying information, which could include name,
[Social Security number], account number, password, or
other information linked to an individual, to commit a
violation of federal or state law.”62
In 2004, Congress passed the Identity Theft Penalty
Enhancement Act to “address[ ] the growing problem of
identity theft” and to “enhance[ ] penalties for persons who
steal identities to commit terrorists acts, immigration
violations, firearms offenses, and other serious crimes.”63
The statute at issue in the Flores-Figueroa case, as well as
the other cases discussed in this Comment, is § 1028A,
titled Aggravated Identity Theft, which provides:
(a) Offenses.—
(1) In general.—Whoever, during and in relation to any felony
violation enumerated in subsection (c), knowingly transfers,
possesses, or uses, without lawful authority, a means of
identification of another person shall, in addition to the
punishment provided for such felony, be sentenced to a term of
imprisonment of 2 years.
(2) Terrorism offense.—Whoever, during and in relation to any
felony violation enumerated in section 2332b(g)(5)(B), knowingly
transfers, possesses, or uses, without lawful authority, a means of
identification of another person or a false identification document

60. See Protecting Privacy and Preventing Misuse of Social Security Numbers:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Social Security of the H. Comm. on Ways and
Means, 107th Cong. 16 (2001) (statement of Hon. James G. Huse, Jr., Inspector
General, Social Security Administration).
61. See, e.g., Identity Theft and Assumption Deterrence Act of 1998, Pub. L.
No. 105-318, 112 Stat. 3007; 18 U.S.C. § 1028A (2006).
62. TASKFORCE REPORT, supra note 32, at 101 n.1.
63. H.R. REP. NO. 108-528, at 5 (2004), as reprinted in 2004 U.S.C.C.A.N. 779,
779.
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shall, in addition to the punishment provided for such felony, be
64
sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 5 years.

An “enumerated felony” is defined in § 1028A(c) as any
felony violation of any of the following:
(1) section 641 (relating to theft of public money, property, or
rewards), section 656 (relating to theft, embezzlement, or
misapplication by bank officer or employee), or section 664
(relating to theft from employee benefit plans);
(2) section 911 (relating to false personation of citizenship);
(3) section 922(a)(6) (relating to false statements in connection
with the acquisition of a firearm);
(4) any provision contained in this chapter (relating to fraud and
false statements), other than this section or section 1028(a)(7);
(5) any provision contained in chapter 63 (relating to mail, bank,
and wire fraud);
(6) any provision contained in chapter 69 (relating to nationality
and citizenship);
(7) any provision contained in chapter 75 (relating to passports
and visas);
(8) section 523 of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (15 U.S.C. 6823)
(relating to obtaining customer information by false pretenses);
(9) section 243 or 266 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8
U.S.C. 1253 and 1306) (relating to willfully failing to leave the
United States after deportation and creating a counterfeit alien
registration card);
(10) any provision contained in chapter 8 of title II of the
Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1321 et seq.) (relating
to various immigration offenses); or
(11) section 208, 811, 1107(b), 1128B(a), or 1632 of the Social
Security Act (42 U.S.C. 408, 1011, 1307(b), 1320a-7b(a), and
1383a) (relating to false statements relating to programs under
65
the Act).

64. 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(1)-(2).
65. 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(c) (footnote omitted).
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The wide variety of predicate felonies ensure that the
Aggravated Identity Theft statute can be applied by
prosecutors in many different situations, including,
significantly for Flores-Figueroa, the immigration and
employment contexts.
It is important to note that this offense carries a
mandatory sentencing increase of two to five years,
depending on whether it is a general § 1028A(a)(1) offense
or a more serious terrorism offense under § 1028A(a)(2). As
a result, prosecutors can use the threat of an aggravated
identity charge as leverage to ensure an early plea bargain
from defendants to the underlying felony.66 In the case of
illegal immigrants, an agreement to immediate deportation
is often a term of the plea bargain.67
In light of the mandatory nature of § 1028A(a)(1) and
the serious consequences its application has on illegal
immigrants, there has been much debate over the statute’s
meaning. The debate centers on the reach of the word
“knowingly” in the statute. The government’s interpretation
of the statute would limit the knowledge requirement to the
verbs “transfers, possesses, or uses,” or, at most, to the
direct object of the verbs “a means of identification,” thus
freeing the prosecutor from the burden of proving that the
defendant knew the “means of identification” belonged to
another person. Flores-Figueroa’s interpretation, and that
of the other defendants like him, is that the knowledge
requirement extends to the phrase “of another person,” thus
making the prosecutor’s burden of proof more difficult and
hopefully, in the defendants’ view, exempting illegal
immigrants who purchase identification information from
third parties for employment purposes from punishment
under § 1028A(a)(1).
IV. THE CASES
Although others before him had appealed similar cases
to the Supreme Court,68 Flores-Figueroa’s petition for a Writ

66. See Editorial, And Unequal Justice for Some, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 25, 2009,
at A26; Preston, supra note 13.
67. See Preston, supra note 13.
68. See, e.g., United States v. Mendoza-Gonzalez, 520 F.3d 912 (8th Cir. 2008)
vacated, 129 S. Ct. 2377 (2009); United States v. Hurtado, 508 F.3d 603 (11th
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of Certiorari was granted by the Supreme Court because his
lawyers had the benefit of making arguments based on the
decisions of six prior circuit court cases.69 This part will
review the opinions of the other circuit courts on
§ 1028A(a)(1) and the Supreme Court’s decision in FloresFigueroa.
The following six circuit court decisions provide a rich
variety of opinions on the proper interpretation of
§ 1028A(a)(1). The circuits were evenly split on the issue.
The D.C., First, and Ninth Circuits agreed with the
defendant’s interpretation of the statute, that the
knowledge requirement extended to the phrase “of another
person;” while the Fourth, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits
agreed with the government and held that the prosecution
was not required to prove that the defendant knew the
means of identification used belonged to another person.
Although the three former circuits ultimately agreed with
the defendant’s interpretation of § 1028A(a)(1), they found
the statute to be ambiguous and resolved the ambiguity in
different ways. The latter circuits, on the other hand, did
not find the statute ambiguous, and held that the statutory
text clearly supported the government’s reading of
§ 1028A(a)(1).
A. District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals
In United States v. Villanueva-Sotelo, the defendant, a
Mexican national, presented District of Columbia
Metropolitan Police officers with a permanent resident card
that displayed “his own name and photograph, listed Mexico
as his country of origin, and included an alien registration
number.”70 Although Villanueva-Sotelo knew that the
registration number was fake and that it did not belong to
him, the government in the case conceded that it did not
have any evidence to prove that he knew that the
registration number in fact belonged to another person.71
Villanueva-Sotelo moved to dismiss the third count of the
Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 2903 (2008); United States v. Montejo, 442
F.3d 213 (4th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 879 (2006).
69. See Reply Brief for the Petitioner at 1-2, Flores-Figueroa v. United States,
129 S. Ct. 1886 (2009) (No. 08-108).
70. 515 F.3d 1234, 1236 (D.C. Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 2377 (2009).
71. Id.
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indictment for aggravated identity theft,72 arguing that the
government was required “to prove he actually knew the
alien registration number belonged to another person.”73
After a “particularly illuminating” discussion with the
prosecutor,74 the district court judge agreed with
Villanueva-Sotelo’s interpretation of the statute and
dismissed the aggravated identity theft count.75
On the government’s appeal, the District of Columbia
Circuit Court of Appeals decided that “knowingly” must at
least extend to the direct object’s principal modifier, “of
identification,” because “were it otherwise, a person could be
convicted for ‘knowingly us[ing] or transfer[ring],’ without
lawful authority, anything at all that happened to contain a
means of identification.”76 Having come this far, the court
seemed unsure of how to deal with the statute’s final
prepositional phrase, “of another person.”77 Finding both the
government’s interpretation, halting the reach of knowingly
to “of identification,” and Villanueva-Sotelo’s interpretation,
72. 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(1) (2006).
73. Villanueva-Sotelo, 515 F.3d at 1236.
74. The “particularly illuminating” discussion from the trial hearing on April
4, 2007:
[PROSECUTOR]: [I]t is stealing in the sense that if I make up a
number and it belongs to someone else, I have taken that person’s
number that was rightfully assigned by a U.S. agency.
THE COURT: If you make up the number?
[PROSECUTOR]: Yes. If I—
THE COURT: What if you make up a number that doesn’t belong to
anybody?
[PROSECUTOR]: Then you don’t charge the offense, there is no offense
because it’s not a means of identification of another person.
THE COURT: So if the defendant picked a number out of the air and it
was [your] number, he’s guilty, but if he picked a number out of the air
and [Immigration and Customs Enforcement] hasn’t assigned it to
anybody, he’s not guilty?
[PROSECUTOR]: That’s correct.
Id. at 1236-37 (alterations in original).
75. Id. at 1237.
76. Id. at 1238 (alterations in original).
77. Id. at 1239 (“But what of the second and crucial prepositional phrase ‘of
another person’?”).
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extending the reach of knowingly to “of another person,”
equally plausible, the majority ultimately concluded that
the language of the statute was ambiguous.78
To resolve the text’s ambiguity, the majority looked to
the “statutory structure, relevant legislative history, [and]
congressional purposes expressed in the [statute.]”79 The
majority found support for Villanueva-Sotelo’s version of
congressional intent80 in the statute’s title, “Aggravated
identity theft,”81 the legislative history,82 and the statute’s
floor debate.83 Summing up their review of the legislative
history, the court concluded that “[a]t no point in the
legislative record did anyone so much as allude to a
situation in which a defendant ‘wrongfully obtain[ed]’
another person’s personal information unknowingly,
unwittingly, and without intent.”84 Instead, the court
decided that the intent of the statute was to reach
intentional theft rather than the conduct of Villanueva-

78. See id. at 1239-43.
79. Id. at 1243 (alteration in original) (quoting Fla. Power & Light Co. v.
Lorion, 470 U.S. 729, 737 (1985)).
80. “Villanueva-Sotelo argues that Congress intended to target identity theft
and the thieves who perpetrate it, rather than to create a sentencing
enhancement for individuals who use fraudulent identifying information
belonging purely by happenstance to someone else.” Id.
81. The court noted:
As [the] title demonstrates, the statute concerns “theft,” i.e., “the
felonious taking and removing of personal property with intent to
deprive the rightful owner of it.” Yet Villanueva-Sotelo, having
had no idea that his forged alien registration number belonged to
anyone at all, couldn’t possibly have had the intent to deprive
another person of his or her identity. . . . That’s not theft.
Id. (citation omitted).
82. Id. at 1243-44 (explaining the statute’s purpose “to target and punish
‘identity thieves,’” describing how identity thieves “obtain[ ] individuals’
personal information for misuse,” and listing examples of identity theft where,
in each case, “the thief knew the stolen information belonged to another person”
(alteration in original)).
83. Id. at 1244-45 (“This legislation will allow prosecutors to identify identity
thieves who steal an identity . . . for purposes of committing one or more crimes.
. . . [T]he legislation would facilitate the prosecution of criminals who steal
identities in order to commit felonies . . . .” (emphasis added)).
84. Id. at 1245 (alternation in original).
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Sotelo, which was mere “accidental misappropriation.”85
Accordingly, the court held “that section 1028A(a)(1)’s mens
rea requirement extends to the . . . statute’s defining
element—that the means of identification used belongs to
another person,”86 thus bringing the mens rea requirements
of the statute more in line with traditional, common law
notions of theft.87
B. First Circuit Court of Appeals
In United States v. Godin, the defendant “defrauded
eight banks and credit unions” by opening accounts using
Social Security numbers that she fabricated “by altering the
fourth and fifth digits of her own social security number.”88
The First Circuit Court of Appeals attempted a grammatical
breakdown of the different parts of the § 1028A(a)(1).89 The
court noted that “in a purely grammatical sense,
‘knowingly,’ as an adverb, modifies only the verbs,” but it
also stressed that interpreting a statute is not a “purely
grammatical exercise” because “in criminal statutes,
adverbs that are also mens rea requirements frequently

85. Id. at 1246.
86. Id.
87. See, e.g., BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1516 (8th ed. 2004) (“[Theft is t]he
felonious taking and removing of another’s personal property with the intent of
depriving the true owner of it . . . .”); O.W. HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 71
(1881) (“Larceny is ‘the taking and removing, by trespass, of personal property
which the trespasser knows to belong either generally or specifically to another,
with intent to deprive such owner of his ownership therein.’” (quoting JOEL
PRENTISS BISHOP, COMMENTARIES ON THE CRIMINAL LAW 431 (1881))).
88. 534 F.3d 51, 54 (1st Cir. 2008).
89. The court determined that:
“Knowingly,” as an adverb, modifies the verbs “transfers, possesses, or
uses.” The prepositional phrase “without lawful authority” is an adverb
phrase that also modifies the verbs. “Means” is the direct object of the
verbs, and the prepositional phrase “of identification” is an adjective
phrase that modifies the direct object. Finally, the prepositional phrase
“of another person” is an adjective phrase that modifies “identification.”
Together, “knowingly transfers, possesses, or uses, without lawful
authority, a means of identification of another person” is a participial
phrase describing the subject “whoever.”
Id. at 56.
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extend to non-verbs.” 90 Furthermore, the court emphasized
that it was interpreting “a criminal statute and not an
English textbook,” so the grammatically correct reading of
the statute was not necessarily “the best or even [the] most
likely reading of § 1028A(a)(1).”91 With this in mind, the
court found the question of whether “knowingly” extends to
“of another person” to be ambiguous. 92 In reaching this
conclusion, the court relied on the Supreme Court’s decision
in Liparota, where the court concluded that looking at the
statutory text alone could not answer the question of how
far “knowingly” extended in a similarly worded statute.93
After failing to resolve the ambiguity through an indepth analysis of the “surrounding language and the
statute’s structure,” 94 the title of the statute,95 and the
statute’s legislative history,96 the court found that it was
“unable to ascertain whether Congress intended the
‘knowingly’ mens rea requirement to extend to ‘of another
person.’”97 Facing a statute with such “grievous ambiguity,”
the court concluded that the rule of lenity required it to
90. Id.
91. Id. at 57.
92. Id. at 58.
93. Id. (“Either limiting knowingly to the verbs and their direct objects or
extending it throughout the entire phrase ‘would accord with ordinary usage.’”
(quoting Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 424 (1985))).
94. Id. (quoting United States v. Jimenez, 507 F.3d 13, 19 (1st Cir. 2007)).
The court compared § 1028(a)(1) to § 1028(a)(2) but found that this failed to
resolve the ambiguity. Id. at 59.
95. Id. While the use of the word “theft” in the title tends to imply an
intentional act, the court found that “[i]t is also plausible that Congress
intended to define ‘identity theft’ as using someone else’s identity rather than
taking someone else’s identity.” Id.
96. Id. at 59-60. The court found that the House Report accompanying the
Identity Theft Penalty Enhancement Act was replete with the terms “theft” and
“thieves,” and that one of the stated purposes of the statute was to increase
sentences for identity thieves. The report also gave “examples of identity theft
that fit comfortably within the traditional definition of theft.” Id. While the
court agreed that it would be reasonable to conclude that Congress intended to
only punish “those who knowingly use another’s identification,” they pointed out
that there was also ample evidence to support an interpretation that it was
Congress’s “intent to cover actions that do not fit the traditional definition of
theft.” Id.
97. Id. at 61.
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resolve the ambiguity in the statute in the defendant’s
favor, and thus held that the “knowingly” extended to “of
another person.”98
C. Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals
In United States v. Montejo, the defendant attempted to
obtain employment by using a fake resident alien card and
a Social Security card with his name and photograph, but
while using “fabricated numbers.”99 Far from being
fabricated, the alien registration number “had been
assigned to a Tanzanian man named Nassim Mohamed
Leon,” and the “Social Security number used by Montejo
had actually been assigned to another person.”100 Montejo
apparently “walked into the United States in January 2002
and had purchased, in Phoenix, Arizona, the Resident Alien
card and the Social Security card for $60.00 . . . and [then]
used the cards to obtain employment.”101
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals began its analysis
of the aggravated identity theft statute by looking at the
statutory language and structure.102 The court looked at the
grammatical structure of the statute and concluded that
as a matter of common usage, “knowingly” does not
modify the entire lengthy predicate[, “a means of
identification of another person,”] that follows it.
Simply placing “knowingly” at the start of this long
predicate does not transform it into a modifier of all
the words that follow. Good usage requires that the
limiting modifier, the adverb “knowingly,” be as close
as possible to the words which it modifies, here,
“transfers, possesses, or uses.”103

The court then analogized the aggravated identity theft
statute to a “grammatically [in]distinguishable” statute
from a precedential Fourth Circuit case, in which the court
98. Id. at 60-61.
99. 442 F.3d 213, 214 (4th Cir. 2006).
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 215.
103. Id. (citing ROBERT FUNK ET AL., THE ELEMENTS OF GRAMMAR FOR WRITERS
ch. 4 (1991)).
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determined that “‘knowingly’ extended to the [direct] object .
. . but not to the prepositional phrase modifying it.”104
Furthermore, the court distinguished the aggravated
identity theft statute from the statute at issue in a Supreme
Court case that was found to be grammatically ambiguous
because that case’s “discussion of the scope of ‘knowingly’
should not be understood apart from the Court’s primary
stated concern: avoiding criminalization of otherwise nonculpable conduct.”105 Concluding their analysis of the
statutory text, the court held that the aggravated identity
theft statute was not ambiguous and that “the defendant
need not be aware of the actual assignment of the numbers
to an individual to have violated the statute.”106
D. Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals
In United States v. Mendoza-Gonzalez, the defendant
“completed a Form I-9 in connection with his employment at
a Swift & Company (“Swift”) pork processing plant . . . in
which he represented that he was a ‘citizen or national of
the United States,’ and submitted a photo identification
card in the name of Dinicio Gurrola III to verify his
identity.”107 Immigration and Customs Enforcement agents
“conducted a raid at the Swift plant,” and MendozaGonzalez was charged with a five-count indictment,
including a charge of “aggravated identity theft in violation
of 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(1).”108 The jury in the district court
convicted Mendoza-Gonzalez on all counts, and he appealed,
arguing that the Government failed to prove the essential
elements of § 1028A(a)(1) because it did not show “beyond a
reasonable doubt that Mendoza-Gonzalez had actual
knowledge that the identification he used belong[ed] to an
104. See id. at 216 (discussing United States v. Cook, 76 F.3d 596 (4th Cir.
1996)).
105. Id. (discussing Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419 (1985)). As other
Circuit Courts have more clearly explained, the concern of criminalizing nonculpable conduct is not present in this statute because aggravated identity theft
can only be committed “during and in relation to any felony violation
enumerated in subsection (c)” of the statute. 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(1) (2006). See
discussion, infra, Part IV.E-F.
106. Montejo, 442 F.3d at 217.
107. 520 F.3d 912, 913-14 (8th Cir. 2008).
108. Id. at 914.
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actual person, that Gurrola was an actual person and that
Gurrola was still a living person at the time MendozaGonzalez fraudulently used his identification.”109
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals began by
describing the process of statutory interpretation:
In interpreting a statute we first determine whether the
language at issue has a plain and unambiguous meaning with
regard to the particular dispute in the case. If so, we apply the
plain language of the statute. Only if the language is
ambiguous may we look beyond the text. However, [a] mere
disagreement among litigants over the meaning of a statute
does not prove ambiguity; it usually means that one of the
litigants is simply wrong.110

The court noted that “‘[g]ood usage requires that the
limiting modifier, the adverb ‘knowingly,’ be as close as
possible to the words which it modifies,’”111 and additionally;
“‘[t]he fact that [‘knowingly’] is placed before the verbs
‘transfers, possesses, or uses’ indicates that [it] modifies
those verbs, not the later language in the statute.’”112 As
further support for their grammatical analysis, the court
reasoned that the “last antecedent rule holds that
qualifying words and phrases usually apply only to the
words or phrases immediately preceding or following them,
not to others that are more remote.”113 While recognizing
that the last antecedent rule “is not an absolute and can
assuredly be overcome by other indicia of meaning,” the
court ultimately concluded that “the plain language of
§ 1028A(a)(1) limits ‘knowingly’ to modifying ‘transfers,
possesses, or uses’ and not ‘of another person.’”114 Since the
court concluded that this was the unambiguous meaning of
the statute, the government “was not required to prove that
109. Id.
110. Id. (alteration in original) (citation omitted).
111. Id. at 915 (quoting United States v. Montejo, 442 F.3d 213, 215 (4th. Cir.
2006)).
112. Id. (quoting United States v. Hurtado, 508 F.3d 603, 609 (11th Cir.
2007)).
113. Id. (citing NORMAN J. SINGER & J.D. SHAMBIE SINGER, SUTHERLAND
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 47:33 (7th ed. 2007)).
114. Id. (citing Barnhart v. Thomas, 540 U.S. 20, 26 (2003)).
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Mendoza-Gonzalez knew that Gurrola was a real person to
prove he violated § 1028A(a)(1).”115
E. Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
In United States v. Miranda-Lopez, the defendant
attempted to “enter the United States using a resident alien
card in the name of ‘Jorge A. Garcia Fregoso.’”116 The
identification card turned out to be authentic, and had been
validly issued not to Miranda-Lopez, but to Jorge A. Garcia
Fregoso.117 At trial, the defendant testified that “he had
never seen the Garcia-Fregoso permanent resident card
before” and that “the identification card did not belong to
him.”118 The district court found Miranda-Lopez guilty of
aggravated identity theft, and he appealed, arguing that the
government “failed to prove that [he] actually knew that the
identification belonged to another person.”119
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals stated that the
main issue in the case was whether “the adverb ‘knowingly’
in the statute modif[ies] ‘of another person’ or merely
‘transfers, possesses, or uses.’”120 Comparing plain meaning
of the language of the aggravated identity theft statute to
the ones at issue in United States v. Liparota121 and United
States v. X-Citement Video, Inc.,122 the court reasoned that §
1028A(a)(1) was just as ambiguous.123 Indeed, the court
determined that § 1028A(a)(1) could “plausibly be
interpreted to require knowledge only of the transfer,
possession, or use of a means of identification,” but also
115. Id.
116. 532 F.3d 1034, 1035 (9th Cir. 2008).
117. Id. at 1036.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 1037.
120. Id. at 1038.
121. 471 U.S. 419, 433 (1985) (holding that the government was required to
“prove that the defendant knew that his acquisition or possession of food stamps
was in a manner unauthorized by statute or regulations” in a grammatically
ambiguous statute).
122. 513 U.S. 64, 77-78 (1994) (extending the reach of “knowingly” in a statute
to prevent the criminalization of innocent conduct and to provide a mens rea
requirement to an element of the crime).
123. See Miranda-Lopez, 532 F.3d at 1038-39.

242

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 58

found that it would “not [be] unreasonable to read
‘knowingly’ to modify all of the subsequent phrases in the
sentence,” including the phrase “of another person.”124
Accepting the grammatical analysis of the D.C. Circuit,125
the court considered the legislative history of § 1028A(a)(1),
concluding that “[i]n this case, the legislative history does
not definitely resolve the question of what ‘knowingly’ is
meant to modify.”126
Finding the statute ambiguous and the legislative
history unpersuasive, the court turned to the rule of lenity,
which requires a court to “resolve any ambiguity in the
scope of a criminal statute in favor of the defendant.”127
Accordingly, the court held that “the government was
required to prove that Miranda-Lopez knew that the
identification belonged to another person,” noting that “this
is not an insurmountable burden, especially in [this] case
where the identification document contains someone else’s
photo and does not appear to be a fake.”128
F. Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals
In United States v. Hurtado, the defendant submitted a
passport application for the name Marcos Alexis Martinez
Colon, using “a birth certificate and driver’s license in the
same name” as supporting documents.129 While all of the
documents were authentic, a passport specialist reviewing
Hurtado’s application noticed some discrepancies between
the application and the documents, indicating fraud.130 Upon
124. Id.
125. See id. at 1039 (“In holding that the language of § 1028A(a)(1) is
ambiguous, we follow the D.C. Circuit’s reasoning . . . [and] detailed
grammatical analysis.”); see also discussion of Villanueva-Sotelo, supra Part
IV.A.
126. See id. at 1039 (briefly summarizing the D.C. Circuit’s analysis of §
1028A(a)(1)’s legislative history).
127. Id. at 1040 (citing United States v. Santos, 128 S. Ct. 2020, 2025 (2008)
and Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 427 (1985)).
128. Id.
129. 508 F.3d 603, 604 (11th Cir. 2007).
130. Id. (“Among other things, [the passport specialist] noticed that (1) the
ages of the applicant’s parents were written instead of the requested dates of
birth, (2) the supporting driver’s license was issued shortly before the passport
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further investigation, federal agents discovered that
Hurtado had “bought a visa in Columbia to come to the
United States, and . . . he later bought identification papers
from a friend in Boston so he could obtain a passport and
visit his family in Columbia.”131
The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed
Hurtado’s conviction on two counts of aggravated identity
theft.132 Analyzing the plain meaning of the statute, the
court held that the phrase “without lawful authority” was
intended to reach a broader range of conduct than theft, and
the court also found that the Hurtado’s unauthorized use of
the identification information was well within the scope of
§ 1028A(a)(1).133 In reaching this conclusion, the court found
that “[t]he fact that Congress used the word ‘stolen’ in
§ 1028, but chose the broader phrase ‘without lawful
authority’ in § 1028A(a)(1) plainly indicate[d] that Congress
intended to prohibit a wider range of activities in
§ 1028A(a)(1) than just theft.”134
Regarding the knowledge requirement, the court found
that “[t]he fact that the word ‘knowingly’—an adverb—is
placed before the verbs ‘transfers, possesses, or uses’
indicates that ‘knowingly’ modifies those verbs, not the later
language in the statute.”135 Furthermore, the court reasoned
that “[i]f Congress had intended to extend the knowledge
requirement to other portions of this subsection, it could
have drafted the statute to prohibit the knowing transfer,
possession, or use, without lawful authority, of the means of
identification ‘known to belong to another actual person.’”136
Without such language in the statute, the court held that
application was submitted, and (3) the signature was printed with the surname
Martinez misspelled.”).
131. Id. at 605. The defendant later told federal agents that he “bought a visa
to come to the United States for $7000.” Id. at 606.
132. Id. at 610.
133. Id. at 607 (“For sure, stealing and then using another person’s
identification would fall within the meaning of ‘without lawful authority.’
However, there are other ways someone could possess or use another person’s
identification, yet not have ‘lawful authority’ to do so. There is no dispute here
that Hurtado did not have any authority, much less lawful authority, to use [the
victim’s] identification.”).
134. Id. at 608. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 1028 (2006), with § 1028A(a)(1).
135. Hurtado, 508 F.3d at 609.
136. Id.
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the “plain language” of § 1028A(a)(1) did not dictate
extension of the knowledge requirement to the phrase “of
another person.”137
G. The Supreme Court
In Flores-Figueroa v. United States, the defendant, a
citizen of Mexico, “gave his employer a false name, birth
date, and Social Security number, along with a counterfeit
alien registration card.”138 The numbers on these cards did
not belong to a real person.139 In 2006, Flores-Figueroa gave
his employer new counterfeit cards using his real name.140
ICE agents discovered that the numbers on these new cards
were numbers that had previously been assigned to other
people, and Flores-Figueroa was charged with aggravated
identity theft under § 1028A(a)(1) along with two predicate
offenses.141 The district and circuit court both held that the
government need not prove that Flores-Figueroa knew that
the identification documents belonged to another person.142
Flores-Figueroa appealed and the Supreme Court granted
certiorari to consider the knowledge requirements of
§ 1028A(a)(1).143
The Supreme Court, in a majority opinion authored by
Justice Breyer, began its analysis by pointing out that “[a]s
a matter of ordinary English grammar, it seems natural to
read the statute’s word ‘knowingly’ as applying to all the
subsequently listed elements of the crime.”144 Using the
example sentence, “Smith knowingly transferred the funds
to the account of his brother,” the majority pointed out that
the “adverb [knowingly] that modifies the transitive verb
137. See id. at 609-10 (concluding that the Supreme Court’s concerns about
criminalizing “otherwise innocent conduct” in X-Citement Video and Liparota
were not present in this case, and that this distinction weighed against making
a similar extension of the knowledge requirement to the phrase “‘of another
person’ in § 1028A(a)(1)”).
138. 129 S.Ct. 1886, 1889 (2009).
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 1890.
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[transferred] tells the listener how the subject performed the
entire action, including the object [funds] as set forth in the
sentence.”145 In this example, the reader would normally
understand that “Smith knew the account was his
brother’s,” and “if the bank official later told us that Smith
did not know the account belonged to Smith’s brother, we
should be surprised.”146 Notably, the majority allowed for a
possible exception to the plain meaning reading implied by
ordinary English in sentences that “involve special contexts
or themselves provide a more detailed explanation of
background circumstances that call for such a reading.”147
Although the majority did not provide any examples of what
these special contexts may be, it concluded that none were
present in § 1028A(a)(1).148 Furthermore, the majority
pointed out that “courts ordinarily read a phrase in a
criminal statute that introduces the elements of a crime
with the word ‘knowingly’ as applying that word to each
element.”149
Having apparently determined that the sentence
involved is grammatically unambiguous,150 the majority
nonetheless looked to the government’s arguments to see if
there was any reason sufficient to “overcome the ordinary
meaning” of the statute.151 The Court considered and
rejected arguments based on a comparison between
§ 1028A(a)(1) and § 1028A(a)(2),152 the statute’s expressed
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 1891.
148. Id.
149. Id. (citing United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 79 (1994)
(Stevens, J., concurring)).
150. The Court never actually said that § 1028A(a)(1) is unambiguous, but did
say that “courts ordinarily interpret criminal statutes” according to “ordinary
English usage” absent special contexts that were not present here. FloresFigueroa, 129 S. Ct. at 1891.
151. Id. at 1894.
152. Id. at 1892 (rejecting the argument because of “faulty” reasoning). See
United States v. Miranda-Lopez, 532 F.3d 1034, 1041-43 (Bybee, J., concurring
in part & dissenting in part), for an in-depth discussion of this argument. Bybee
points out that the aggravated identity theft statute contains two separate
offenses, the general § 1028A(a)(1) version, and a more serious, terrorismrelated version under § 1028A(a)(2). Id. at 1042. The wording of the two
versions is mostly identical, but § 1028A(a)(2) adds the phrase “or a false
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purpose and legislative history,153 and the difficulty of
proving knowledge under the statute.154
Ultimately, the majority held that the “ordinary
meaning” of § 1028A(a)(1) requires the government to show
knowledge, and in doing so essentially disagreed with the
analytical approach taken by all six circuit court opinions.
Contrary to the statutory interpretation employed by the
circuit courts,155 the Court did not end its analysis upon
determining the plain meaning of the statute, but instead
looked to see if there were any indicia of intent that would
be sufficient to “overcome” this ordinary meaning.156

identification document” after § 1028A(a)(1)’s final phrase “of another person.”
Id. He argues that the congressional addition of this phrase in § 1028A(a)(2)
makes it unreasonable to extend the knowledge requirement to “of another
person” in § 1028A(a)(1). Id. at 1042-43. While Bybee agrees that extending the
knowledge requirement in § 1028A(a)(1) would be “a reasonable reading [of the
statute], read in isolation,” he argues that doing so would require the knowledge
requirement in § 1028A(a)(2) to be similarly extended through both “of another
person” and “or a false identification document.” Id. at 1042. To do so in
§ 1028A(a)(2), he argues, would be “unnecessary and perhaps absurd” because it
would be “superfluous,” as “[a] person who knowingly transfers a means of
identification without lawful authority must necessarily know that the
identification either belongs to another person or that it is false; there are no
other choices.” Id. Thus, in Bybee’s view, the Supreme Court “should not read
mens rea language that is inconsistent with subsection (a)(2) into an identical
and contemporaneously-adopted subsection (a)(1).” Id. at 1043.
153. Flores-Figueroa, 129 S. Ct. at 1892-93 (rejecting the argument because
the legislative history is inconclusive and supports either inference).
154. Id. at 1893 (rejecting the argument because “in the classic case of identity
theft, intent is generally not difficult to prove” and “the concerns about practical
enforceability are insufficient to outweigh the clarity of the text”).
155. See, e.g., United States v. Godin, 534 F.3d 51, 56 (1st Cir. 2008) (“If the
meaning of the text is unambiguous our task ends there as well. If the statute is
ambiguous, we look beyond the text to the legislative history in order to
determine congressional intent.” (citation omitted)); United States v. MendozaGonzalez, 520 F.3d 912, 914 (8th Cir. 2008) (noting that where statutory text is
unambiguous “we apply the plain language of the statute” and that “[o]nly if the
language is ambiguous may we look beyond the text”); United States v.
Villanueva-Sotelo, 515 F.3d 1234, 1237 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (“[If] the language at
issue has a plain and unambiguous meaning with regard to the particular
dispute in the case . . . our inquiry ends and we apply the statute’s plain
language. But if we find the statutory language ambiguous, we look beyond the
text for other indicia of congressional intent.”).
156. Flores-Figueroa, 129 S. Ct. at 1894.
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In an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment, Justice Scalia underscored the majority’s
departure from strictly textual statutory interpretation,
while nonetheless agreeing with the ultimate result. He
pointed out that “the Court is not content to stop at the
statute’s [unambiguous] text,” and refused to join the
portion of the majority’s opinion searching for reasons to
overcome the ordinary meaning of § 1028A(a)(1).157 Scalia
made it clear that he would oppose any attempt “to mak[e]
criminal what the text would otherwise permit” by resorting
to legislative history to overcome a statute’s plain
grammatical meaning.158 Scalia would also be opposed to a
categorical rule of statutory interpretation extending a
knowledge requirement to each element of a crime where
the statutory text has attempted to grammatically limit
such an extension.159 Ultimately, Scalia concluded that the
“statute’s text is clear” and argued that any discussion by
the majority beyond this fact was unnecessary and
inappropriate.160
In another opinion concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment, Justice Alito argued that “the Court’s point
about ordinary English usage is overstated,” and he feared
that “the Court’s opinion may be read by some as adopting
an overly rigid rule of statutory construction.”161 Alito would
take a contextual approach to interpreting a criminal
statute where a court would “begin with a general
presumption that the specified mens rea applies to all the
elements of [the] offense,” but where the parties would be
allowed to “rebut that presumption” in special contexts.162
157. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring in part & concurring in judgment).
158. Id. at 1894-95 (Scalia, J. concurring in part & concurring in judgment);
see also United States v. R.L.C., 503 U.S. 291, 307 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring
in part & concurring in judgment) (showing that Scalia would also be against
using legislative history to resolve a grammatically ambiguous statute).
159. Flores-Figueroa, 129 S. Ct. at 1894 (Scalia, J., concurring in part &
concurring in judgment); see also United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513
U.S. 64, 80-81 (1994) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority for
“contradicting the plain import of what Congress has specifically prescribed
regarding criminal intent”).
160. Flores-Figueroa, 129 S. Ct. at 1895 (Scalia, J., concurring in part &
concurring in judgment).
161. Id. (Alito, J., concurring in part & concurring in judgment).
162. Id. (Alito, J., concurring in part & concurring in judgment).
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Alito used a statute163 making it unlawful to “knowingly
transport[t] an individual who has not attained the age of
18 years in interstate or foreign commerce” as an example of
a special context where the normal presumption is
justifiably
rebutted.164
Notably,
this
statute
is
grammatically indistinguishable from § 1028A(a)(1), yet
Alito, as well as every circuit court that has addressed the
statute,165 would apparently hold that the adverb
“knowingly” would not extend to the individual’s age.166
Ultimately, Alito concluded that no special context exists in
§ 1028A(a)(1) that would justify a departure from the
presumption that the knowledge requirement extends to
each element of the offense, noting that departure in this
case would lead to absurd results.167
V. ANALYSIS: THE SEARCH FOR PLAIN MEANING
This part is an attempt at a comprehensive analysis of
the issues raised by the six circuit court opinions and the
Supreme Court’s majority and concurrences summarized in
Part IV. First, the circuit courts’ method of statutory
interpretation will be discussed and the statute will be
analyzed grammatically to determine which, if any, of the
courts got this step “right” under their own framework.
Second, the Supreme Court’s opinion will be analyzed to
determine whether it modifies this traditional framework in
any way.

163. 18 U.S.C. § 2423(a) (2006).
164. Flores-Figueroa, 129 S. Ct. at 1895-96 (Alito, J., concurring in part &
concurring in judgment).
165. See United States v. Cox, 577 F.3d 833, 837 (7th Cir. 2009) (finding that
the legislative history of the statute supported the inference that “minors need
special protection against sexual exploitation” and justified declining to extend
the knowledge requirement to the age element of the offense, but also noting
that “a statutory mens rea requirement does not necessarily apply even to each
element of an offense”); see also United States v. Griffith, 284 F.3d 338, 350-51
(2d Cir. 2002); United States v. Taylor, 239 F.3d 994, 997 (9th Cir. 2001).
166. Flores-Figueroa, 129 S. Ct. at 1896 (Alito, J., concurring in part &
concurring in judgment).
167. Id. (Alito, J., concurring in part & concurring in judgment). See supra
notes 73-75 and accompanying text for an example of the absurdity that might
result from such an interpretation of the statute.
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A. Plain Meaning in the Circuit Courts
As an initial matter, courts begin statutory analysis by
looking to the statute’s text to determine the “plain
meaning” of a statute.168 The rationale behind this is that
the member of the public that will be affected by a statute is
likely to end his inquiry into the law with a single reading
of the statute’s text, thus the words themselves should be
given the most weight in determining the law.169 But what
does the phrase “plain meaning” really mean? Does it mean
the strict grammatical interpretation of the statutory text?
Or does it mean the “ordinary usage” of the words?170 And
does the meaning have to be plain to the ordinary public? To
grammarians? To judges? To the illegal immigrants that are
the primary target of the statute? All of these questions are
wrapped up in the simple phrase “plain meaning,” but none
of these questions are asked or answered by the judges in
the six circuit court opinions discussed in Part IV.
While it is probably going too far to require statutory
text to have a plain meaning to illegal immigrants who may
be unfamiliar with the English language, surely it is not
asking too much for a statute’s meaning to be plain to the
judges deciding cases brought under the statute’s authority.
The judges in all six cases start their analysis with a
grammatical interpretation of the statute, with three
concluding the statute is ambiguous and three concluding
168. See, e.g., United States v. Godin, 534 F.3d 51, 56 (1st Cir. 2008) (“Our
interpretive task begins with the statute’s text. We look to the plain meaning of
the words . . . .” (citation omitted)); United States v. Mendoza-Gonzalez, 520
F.3d 912, 914 (8th Cir. 2008) (“In interpreting a statute we first ‘determine
whether the language at issue has a plain and unambiguous meaning with
regard to the particular dispute in the case.’ If so, we apply the plain language
of the statute.” (quoting Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 340 (1997)));
United States v. Villanueva-Sotelo, 515 F.3d 1234, 1237 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (“We
must first ‘determine whether the language at issue has a plain and
unambiguous meaning . . .’” (quoting Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337,
340 (1997))).
169. See Crandon v. United States, 494 U.S. 152, 160 (1990) (“Because
construction of a criminal statute must be guided by the need for fair warning, it
is rare that legislative history or statutory policies will support a construction of
a statute broader than that clearly warranted by the text.”).
170. Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 424 (1985) (stating that both the
defendant’s and the government’s interpretation of a statute would “accord with
ordinary usage”).
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that the plain meaning of the text was that “knowingly” did
not extend to the phrase “of another person.” Such a sharp
division of the proper grammatical interpretation among
the circuit courts tends to support the view that the
meaning of the statute is anything but plain, but, as the
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals aptly pointed out, “‘[a] mere
disagreement . . . over the meaning of a statute does not
prove ambiguity; it usually means that [someone] is simply
wrong.’”171 However, in this case, in a strictly grammatical
analysis of the statutory text, both sides of the circuit split
were “simply wrong.”
While this author does not purport to be an expert in
linguistics, the professors who filed an amicus brief in
support of neither party for the upcoming Flores-Figueroa
Supreme Court case certainly are.172 The brief pointed out
that “the courts that have previously considered how to
interpret [the statute] have made several fundamental
mistakes,”173 specifically:
First, it is a mistake to say that knowingly modifies only the
statute’s verbs. . . . Second, it is a mistake to say that knowingly
modifies transfers, possesses, or uses...a means of identification
but not transfers, possesses, or uses...a means of identification of
another person. . . . Third, it is a mistake to say that there is
174
any ambiguity as to what knowingly modifies.

According to the professors, the argument that
knowingly modifies only the verbs in the statute175 “does not
171. Mendoza-Gonzalez, 520 F.3d at 914 (quoting Bank of Am. Nat’l Trust &
Sav. Ass’n v. 203 N. LaSalle St. P’ship, 526 U.S. 434, 461 (1999)).
172. See Brief of the Professors of Linguistics as Amici Curiae in Support of
Neither Party at Appendix A, Flores-Figueroa, 129 S. Ct. 1886 (No. 08-108)
[hereinafter Linguistics Brief] (listing the credentials of the four authors of the
brief).
173. Id. at 2.
174. Id. at 2-3.
175. This view was held by the majority of the circuit courts. See, e.g., United
States v. Godin, 534 F.3d 51, 56 (1st Cir. 2008) (“In a purely grammatical sense,
‘knowingly,’ as an adverb, modifies only the verbs . . . .”); United States v.
Mendoza-Gonzalez, 520 F.3d 912, 915 (8th Cir. 2008) (“‘The fact that . . .
‘knowingly’ . . . is placed before the verbs ‘transfers, possesses, or uses’ indicates
that [it] modifies those verbs, not the later language in the statute.’” (quoting
United States v Hurtado, 508 F.3d 603, 309 (11th Cir. 2007))); United States v.
Villanueva-Sotelo, 515 F.3d 1234, 1238 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (“The word ‘knowingly’
technically modifies only the verb that follows it (‘uses’) [and] modifies neither
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square with the facts of ordinary English usage.”176 To
underscore this point the brief provided an example where a
person, “who keeps kosher eats food she thinks is kosher
but that actually contains pork.”177 If adverbs only modify
verbs, then it would be equally correct, grammatically
speaking, to say that this person “knowingly ate,” and that
this person “knowingly ate pork” because in that
grammatical world, knowingly would not extend to the word
pork.178 But in the world we live in, “it is hard to believe that
anybody would accept the latter statement to be true; on the
contrary, they would say that the person had eaten the pork
UNknowingly [sic].”179 The second sentence would be wrong
because “[k]nowingly belongs to the class of adverbs that
attribute to one of the actors referred to in the sentence
(usually the actor referred to by the subject) a particular
mental attitude toward the event that the sentence
describes.”180 In sentences such as the one in § 1028A(a)(1),
the direct object is “essential to the sentence’s meaning” and
“can influence what the verb is taken to mean.”181 Thus, it is
wrong to say that the term knowingly modifies only the
verbs in § 1028A(a)(1) because “the predicate of a sentence .
the direct object (‘means’) nor the two prepositional phrases that follow (‘of
identification of another person’).”); Hurtado, 508 F.3d at 609 (“The fact that the
word ‘knowingly’—an adverb—is placed before the verbs ‘transfers, possesses, or
uses’ indicates that ‘knowingly’ modifies those verbs, not the later language in
the statute.” (citing United States v. Jones, 471 F.3d 535, 539 (4th Cir. 2006)));
United States v. Montejo, 442 F.3d 213, 215 (4th Cir, 2006) (“[A]s a matter of
common usage, ‘knowingly’ does not modify the entire lengthy predicate that
follows it.”).
176. Linguistics Brief, supra note 180, at 5.
177. Id.
178. See id.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 6 (emphasis omitted). Furthermore, “[t]his category of adverbs
plays an important role in the law because it includes the mensrea [sic] adverbs
such as intentionally, deliberately, and willfully.” Id. at 7.
181. Id. at 7-8. Some examples of direct objects influencing the meaning of a
sentence: “a. throw a baseball[;] b. throw support behind a candidate[;] c. throw
a boxing match[;] d. throw a party.” Id. at 8. “In each of these cases, the nature
of the event described by the predicate is a function, not of the verb alone, but of
the verb’s interaction with its direct object.” Id. at 9. “The three verbs used in §
1028A—transfer, possess, and use—are all similarly chameleon-like.” Id. For
example: “using a social security number, using a can opener, using drugs, using
the internet,” etc. Id.

252

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 58

. . is an integrated unit of meaning,” and “an adverb such as
knowingly operates on that unit as a whole.”182
The brief also concluded that the entire phrase, “a
means of identification of another person,” is the direct
object of the sentence, not just “a means of identification.”183
Furthermore, the professors argued that “[t]he fact that of
another person is part of the direct object is a matter of
substance, not just grammatical form” because the “phrase
combines with the noun phrase to form a larger unit of
meaning (much like a verb combines with its direct object to
form a larger unit of meaning).”184 Another example was
used to underscore the ordinary manner in which knowingly
is used and understood.185 In the sentence, “[the licensee]
did not knowingly allow the purchase of beer by a person
under the age of twenty-one,” the intended “plain meaning”
is not only that the licensee knew that someone was
purchasing beer, but also that he knew the purchaser was
under the age of twenty-one.186 In this sentence, like in
§ 1028A(a)(1), the “adverb knowingly is understood as
describing the [subject’s] state of mind with respect to an
aspect of that more narrowly specified event,” in this case it
is the purchaser’s age, and in § 1028A(a)(1), it is that the
means of identification belongs to another person.187 Under
the strict grammatical reading of § 1028A(a)(1) offered by
the professors of linguistics, “knowingly” should extend
through the entire sentence to include the phrase “of
another person,” thus requiring the government to prove
that Flores-Figueroa, and other defendants like him,
actually knew that the identification they misused belonged
to another person.
Two grammatical reasons the circuit courts offered for
reaching the opposite conclusion are worth discussing
briefly. First, the Eighth Circuit argued that “‘[g]ood usage
182. Id. at 9. Some of the circuit courts reached this conclusion as to knowingly
modifying the direct object of the statute’s verbs, but did so in order to prevent
“absurd” results criminalizing the transfer of “anything,” not because of proper
grammatical analysis. See United States v. Godin, 524 F.3d, 51 57-58 (1st Cir.
2008); United States v. Villanueva-Sotelo, 515 F.3d 1234, 1238 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
183. Linguistics Brief, supra note 180, at 10 (emphasis omitted).
184. Id. at 11.
185. Id.
186. See id. at 12-13.
187. Id.
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requires that the limiting modifier . . . be as close as
possible to the words which it modifies,’” and thus concluded
that knowingly only modified the sentence’s verbs.188 As the
brief of the professors of linguistics pointed out, “the scope
of an adverb . . . is not governed solely by its linear position
in the sentence” because sentences are “not simply a string
of words arranged in a particular order.”189 Rather,
sentences have “a hierarchical structure in which words are
grouped into phrases and phrases are grouped into larger
phrases.”190 In § 1028A(a)(1), knowingly precedes, and is
adjacent to, the entire predicate phrase “transfers,
possesses, or uses, without lawful authority, a means of
identification of another person”; the entirety of which it
also modifies.191 Second, the Eighth Circuit cited the “last
antecedent rule,” stating that “qualifying words and phrases
usually apply only to the words or phrases immediately
preceding or following them, not to others that are more
remote.”192 However, it seems that the court misstated the
rule; the source that the court cited in support of their
contention actually states that “[r]eferrential and qualifying
words and phrases, where no contrary intention appears,
refer solely to the last antecedent.”193 As an example, “if a
sign announces discounted movie tickets for ‘students,
seniors, and children under the age of eight,’ the qualifying
phrase ‘under the age of eight’ is most likely meant to apply
to children and not to seniors or students.”194 In this
sentence, the word “children” is the antecedent of the
modifying phrase “under the age of eight,” but in §
188. United States v. Mendoza-Gonzalez, 520 F.3d 912, 915 (8th Cir. 2005)
(quoting United States v. Montejo, 442 F.3d 213, 215 (4th Cir. 2006)).
189. Linguistics Brief, supra note 180, at 14.
190. Id.
191. See id. at 15. The brief also points out a further inconsistency with the
Eighth Circuit’s reasoning, in that courts have correctly interpreted another
adverb phrase within § 1028A(a)(1), “during and in relation to any felony
violation enumerated in subsection (c),” as extending through the entire
sentence to include “of another person” even though it is further away from “of
another person” than “knowingly” is. Id. (emphasis omitted).
192. Mendoza-Gonzalez, 520 F.3d at 915 (emphasis added) (citing SINGER &
SINGER, supra note 118 (7th ed. 2007)).
193. SINGER & SINGER, supra note 118 (emphasis added).
194. Brief for the Petitioner at 25, Flores-Figueroa v. United States, 129 S. Ct.
1886 (2009) (No. 08-108).
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1028A(a)(1) “knowingly” modifies the preceding, not
anteceding, phrase, “transfers, possesses, or uses, without
lawful authority, a means of identification of another
person,” thus the last antecedent rule does not apply.195
Having pointed out the analytical errors of half of the
circuit split, the professors of linguistics could have ended
their grammatical analysis, but instead they showed that
the other half of the circuit split was also mistaken. The
professors agreed with the ultimate result that the D.C.,
First, and Ninth Circuits reached, that the government is
required to prove the defendants had knowledge that the
means of identification used belonged to another person, but
disagreed with their finding that the statute itself was
ambiguous.196 These circuits analogized § 1028A(a)(1) to the
statute at issue in Liparota that the Supreme Court held to
be ambiguous.197 However, as the brief demonstrated, the
two statutes are not analogous. In Liparota, the statute had
two equally possible structures depending on which phrase
the final prepositional phrase referred to,198 but in
§ 1028A(a)(1) “there is no feasible alternative structure.”199
The only other possibilities would produce “bizarre” results
where the phrase “of another person is forced against its will
to function adverbally,” by “adjoin[ing it] directly to one of
the verb phrases.”200 Thus, separating the phrase “of
another person” from the direct object “is a matter of trying
to force a square peg into a round hole, and it confirms that
there is no alternative structure that could create a
Liparota-style ambiguity.”201
195. Id. at 25-26.
196. Linguistics Brief, supra note 180, at 15-20.
197. See, e.g., United States v. Miranda-Lopez, 532 F.3d 1034, 1038-39 (9th
Cir. 2008).
198. The phrase “in any manner not authorized by law” could grammatically
apply to different parts of the sentence at issue giving the statute either a “widescope structure” or a “narrow-scope structure.” See Linguistics Brief, supra note
180, at 16.
199. Id. at 19.
200. Id. at 19-20. This would produce a statute where a defendant could be
charged with doing the following with a means of identification: “[p]ossessing it
of another person . . . [, t]ransferring it of another person . . . [or, u]sing it of
another person.” Id. at 20.
201. Id. at 20.
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If the standard for plain meaning is strictly a
grammatical one, then the Supreme Court’s analysis of
§ 1028A(a)(1), and for that matter the analysis of this
author, should have ended here,202 but the questions
surrounding the meaning of “plain meaning” still remain.
As the First Circuit Court of Appeals cautioned, the search
for plain meaning shouldn’t be a “purely grammatical
exercise” because courts are interpreting “a criminal statute
and not an English textbook.”203 The fact is that it is the
public at large that will be affected by a criminal statute, so
the grammatically correct reading of the statute is not
necessarily “the best or even [the] most likely reading of
§ 1028A(a)(1).”204 When six learned judges cannot reach the
correct grammatical conclusion as to the meaning of
§ 1028A(a)(1), why should the public be held to a higher
standard? And for that matter, why is Congress’
understanding of grammar assumed to be perfect?
In fact, many argue that standards of grammar and
punctuation have been on the decline to the dismay of
grammarians and punctuation “sticklers” everywhere.205 But
is “declining” the right word, or would “different” be more
appropriate? As Geoffrey Nunberg points out in his 1983
article Decline of Grammar, “it is understandable that
speakers of a language with a literary tradition would tend
to be pessimistic about its course, [but] there is no more
hard evidence for a general linguistic degeneration than
there is reason to believe that Aaron and Rose are inferior
to Ruth and Gehrig.”206 It is natural to disparage the present
202. Justice Scalia, at least, argues that it does. See Flores-Figueroa v. United
States, 129 S. Ct. 1886, 1894 (2009) (Scalia, J., concurring in part & concurring
in judgment).
203. United States v. Godin, 534 F.3d 51, 56-57 (1st Cir. 2008).
204. Id. at 57.
205. See, e.g., LYNNE TRUSS, EATS, SHOOTS & LEAVES: A ZERO TOLERANCE
APPROACH TO PUNCTUATION passim (2003) (bemoaning the state of punctuation
in the United Kingdom and the United States); Heather Grossman et al.,
Letters to the Editor, E-Mail and the Decline of Writing, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 11,
2004, at A18 (bemoaning the decline of grammar due to the use of e-mail and
texting); Richard Grant White, Every-Day English. How English Has No
Grammar, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16, 1877, at 5 (bemoaning the decline of grammar
standards in the late 1800s).
206. Geoffrey Nunberg, The Decline of Grammar, ATLANTIC MONTHLY,
December
1983,
at
31, available
at
http://www.theatlantic.com/is
sues/97mar/halpern/nunberg.htm.

256

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 58

for the comfort of the past, but at some point it becomes
akin to sticking one’s head in the sand. The English
language is not static. The rules of grammar should not be
used to define a language, but instead should reflect the
state of the language’s common usage.207
And it is perhaps for this reason that the Supreme
Court chose not to follow the mechanistic approach of strict
plain meaning statutory interpretation in favor of a more
context-sensitive approach. Or did they? The majority
opinion and its two concurrences lay out three different
methods of statutory interpretation. How do these methods
work in practice and which method is most appropriate for
use in criminal law?
B. Plain Meaning in the Supreme Court
One thing becomes abundantly clear from the Supreme
Court and circuit court opinions addressing § 1028A(a)(1)—
there is more than one path to reaching a statute’s plain
meaning. However, each path has its pitfalls and sometimes
the plain meaning reached depends more on the path
chosen than the words of a particular statute. This section
will review the different versions of statutory interpretation
employed by the Supreme Court in Flores-Figueroa and will
attempt to determine which analytical framework is most
appropriate in the context of a criminal statute.
Over the years, the Supreme Court has employed
several variations of statutory interpretation ranging from a
comprehensive, “big picture” approach that takes legislative
intent and other extra-textual factors into account to a
strictly textual approach based solely upon the words of the
statute. Both approaches have been a part of Supreme
Court opinions in one form or another for as long as there
have been statutes, but the strict textual approach gained

207. Indeed, the standards of English grammar often differ vastly depending
on the context or social group. See Jeffrey P. Kaplan & Georgia M. Green,
Grammar and Inferences of Rationality in Interpreting the Child Pornography
Statute, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 1223, 1240 (1995) (noting that English differs
grammatically in “regional dialects,” “usages that are dependent on social
groupings associated with the age of the speaker,” and usages “associated with
race”).
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its most recent devotee when Antonin Scalia joined the
Court in 1986.208
Traditional plain meaning analysis begins with a
statute’s text and “[t]he words of a statute are to be taken in
their natural sense, and ordinary signification and
import.”209 Where the meaning of the words is ambiguous,
extra-textual sources, most often legislative history, are
examined to determine the intent of the statute. Where the
Court can clearly divine such intent, it will resolve the
textual ambiguity to effectuate the statute’s intended
purpose.210 Where there is no ambiguity in the words of a
statute, “[t]he case must be a strong one indeed to justify a
Court in departing from the plain meaning of the words.”211
Examples of strong justification for departure include
situations where the plain, unambiguous meaning of the
statute leads to “absurd or futile results”212 or results that
are unreasonable and “plainly at variance with the policy of
the legislation as a whole.”213 A plain meaning that produces
unusually harsh results may also provide a strong
justification for departure.
Under this traditional plain meaning approach,
“[o]bviously there is danger that the courts’ conclusion as to
legislative purpose will be unconsciously influenced by the
judges’ own views or by factors not considered by the
208. See Robin Kundis Craig, The Stevens/Scalia Principle and Why it
Matters: Statutory Conversations and a Cultural Critical Critique of the Strict
Plain Meaning Approach, 79 TUL. L. REV. 955, 960-62 (2005).
209. United States v. Morris, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 464, 471 (1840).
210. See, e.g., Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1, 31 (1948) (It is the “wellsettled doctrine of this Court to read a statute, assuming that it is [ambiguous],
in the manner which effectuates rather than frustrates the major purpose of the
legislative draftsmen.”).
211. Morris, 39 U.S. 464, 471 (quoting United States v. Wiltberger, 18 U.S. (5
Wheat.) 76, 95-96 (1820)).
212. United States v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 310 U.S. 534, 543 (1940); see, e.g.,
United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64 (1994) (declining to follow
the plain meaning of a statute because it would lead to the absurd result of
criminalizing innocent conduct).
213. Ozawa v. United States, 260 U.S. 178, 194 (1922). In such a situation, the
Court “may then look to the reason of the enactment and inquire into its
antecedent history and give it effect in accordance with its design and purpose,
sacrificing, if necessary, the literal meaning in order that the purpose may not
fail.” Id.
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enacting body.”214 The adherent to the traditional plain
meaning approach would argue that “[a] lively appreciation
of [this] danger is the best assurance of escape from its
threat.”215 An advocate of the strict textual plain meaning
approach would likely be unconvinced by this argument
because any consideration of the policy behind a statute
necessarily leads to the problem of placing the judiciary in
the role of the legislature.
It is against this danger that the strict textual plain
meaning approach attempts to protect. Under this
approach, the Court must normally limit its inquiry to “the
particular statutory language at issue, as well as the
language and design of the statute as a whole.”216 Generally,
“[t]he plain meaning of legislation should be conclusive,
except in the ‘rare cases [in which] the literal application of
a statute will produce a result demonstrably at odds with
the intentions of its drafters.’”217 For the strict textualist, “a
literal reading of Congress’ words is generally the only
proper reading of those words,” and any attempt to divine
Congress’ true intentions from sources extraneous to the
statute itself “is to set sail on an aimless journey.” 218
The type of statute being interpreted is a consideration
that must be addressed in addition to the inherent
philosophical differences between the two approaches. In
criminal statutes, “a more rigid rule of construction prevails
than in relation to other statutes.”219 This is because of due
process and notice concerns. Specifically, Congress should
be required to clearly state what constitutes criminal
conduct because it is a “fundamental principle that no
citizen should be held accountable for a violation of a
statute whose commands are uncertain, or subjected to
punishment that is not clearly prescribed.”220 For this
214. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 310 U.S. at 544.
215. Id.
216. K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 291 (1988); Offshore Logistics,
Inc. v. Tallentire, 477 U.S. 207, 220-21 (1986).
217. United States v. Ron Pair Enters., 489 U.S. 235, 242 (1989) (quoting
Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 571 (1982)).
218. United States v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84, 93 (1985).
219. United States v. Morris, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 464, 469-70 (1840).
220. United States v. Santos, 128 S. Ct. 2020, 2025 (2008). This principle is
embodied in the judicially created “rule of lenity” which “requires ambiguous
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reason, many commentators argue that the strict textual
plain meaning approach is appropriate for federal criminal
statutes.221
In contrast, civil and administrative statutes are subject
to a less rigid rule of construction and the importance of
plain meaning is diminished. In this situation, a more
contextualized approach to statutory interpretation makes
sense. This is because these statutes “are not directed at
ordinary citizen speakers of English, but at a small
community of lawyers, regulators, and people subject to
their specific regulations.”222 Because these statutes and
regulations often deal with terms of art specific to a
particular industry that are often outside of the experience
of an ordinary citizen, the “legislative history, established
norms of construction, and other evidence about the context
in which the legislation arose . . . is more likely than
linguistic [plain meaning] analysis to help an outside judge
shed light on what Congress meant.”223
Each of the three opinions in Flores-Figueroa employed
a version of statutory interpretations falling somewhere
along the spectrum between the traditional plain meaning
approach and the strict textual plain meaning approach.

criminal laws to be interpreted in favor of the defendants subjected to them.” Id.
In the United States, the rule itself dates back “at least to 1820, when Chief
Justice Marshall described it as ‘perhaps not much less old than [statutory]
construction itself.’” Note, The New Rule of Lenity, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2420, 2420
(2006) (quoting United States v. Wiltberger, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 76, 95 (1820)).
221. See, e.g., Craig, supra note 216, at 965 (“The strict plain meaning
approach serves the same principles of fairness and due process [as the rule of
lenity] and thus could similarly work to reduce arbitrariness in federal criminal
law enforcement.”); Stephen F. Ross, The Limited Relevance of Plain Meaning,
73 WASH. U. L.Q. 1057, 1063 (1995) (“The one area where . . . plain meaning
does matter involves penal and criminal statutes.”); Frederick Schauer, The
Practice and Problems of Plain Meaning: A Response to Aleiinkoff and Shaw, 45
VAND. L. REV. 715, 739 (1992) (“[O]rdinary meaning, rather than technical
meaning, governs when penal statutes are construed strictly for reasons of
notice to their addressees.”).
222. Ross, supra note 229, at 1057; see also Craig, supra note 216, at 968
(arguing that federal courts should acknowledge that “highly sophisticated
regulated entities and their related industry and trade political action groups
and the equally sophisticated and often opposing public interest organizations”
are a part of the “subculture” targeted by civil and regulatory statutes).
223. Ross, supra note 229, at 1057.
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1. Justice Breyer’s Majority Opinion. Justice Breyer’s
majority opinion is fairly textual, 224 and it recognizes that
criminal statutes are normally strictly construed.225
However, it does allow for the possibility of deviation from a
statute’s plain meaning in “special contexts” where extratextual sources show that the plain meaning of the statute
contradicts its intended meaning and purpose.226 Although
the opinion does not say which contexts would qualify as
special, Breyer did address the issue in a much earlier
opinion as chief judge on the First Circuit Court of Appeals.
In United States v. Gendron, then-Chief Judge Breyer
was called on to interpret the same child pornography
statute that was at issue in X-Citement Video.227 In that
opinion, he expanded on his view of a contextual inquiry:
We concede that one cannot know automatically, simply from
the position of the words in the sentence, just which of the words
following “knowingly” the word “knowingly” is meant to modify.
However, that linguistic fact simply reflects the more basic fact
that statements, and parts of statements, quite often derive
their meaning from context. The sentence “John knows that
people speak Spanish in Tegucigalpa, which is the capital of
Honduras,” taken by itself, leaves us uncertain whether or not
John knows that Tegucigalpa is the capital of Honduras; but,
the context of the story in which the sentence appears, a context
that includes other sentences, may clear up our uncertainty and
leave us with no doubt at all.
Similarly, when courts interpret criminal statutes, they draw
upon context, including the statute’s purpose and various
background legal principles, to determine which states of mind
accompany which particular elements of the offense. Thus,
courts normally hold that the prosecutor need not prove the
defendant’s state of mind in respect to “jurisdictional facts” (for
example, that an assault victim was a federal officer, or that
stolen checks moved in the mail), whatever the mental state
required for the crime’s other elements. Context (what
ordinarily counts as bad behavior; the reason why Congress
mentions jurisdictional facts; etc.), in addition to the position of
224. Flores-Figueroa v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 1886, 1890-94 (2009).
225. Id. at 1891.
226. Id.
227. 18 F.3d 955 (1994). Between the Gendron opinion and the Supreme
Court’s consideration of X-Citement Video, Breyer was appointed to the
Supreme Court.
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words in a sentence, helps a court decide how, and when, to
228
interpret statutes as incorporating states of mind.

For Breyer, it appears that the average citizen’s
interpretation of a statute would not always be its plain
meaning. Instead, the context of a statute includes various
“legal principles” and legal interpretations of the words of
the statute. In the statute at issue in Gendron and XCitement Video, the legal principle that every element of an
offense should have a mens rea requirement was used to
extend the word knowingly to portions of the statute that
appeared to be grammatically impossible.229 If this is truly
what Breyer means by “special contexts,” his method of
statutory interpretation may lead to notice problems in
criminal statutes, where the average layman may lack the
specialized legal knowledge to know exactly what has been
criminalized.
2. Justice Scalia’s Concurrence. Scalia’s concurrence is
strictly textual. For Scalia, the inquiry into the statute’s
meaning is purely grammatical and it ends “once
[knowingly] is understood to modify the object of [a] verb[
].”230 It is hardly surprising that Scalia’s strict textual
approach decries the use of legislative history to “expand a
statute beyond the limits [of] its text,” but it also appears
that Scalia disagrees with the majority opinion’s use of legal
“gloss” on the text.231 He makes this point clear by renewing
his disapproval of the Court’s decision in X-Citement
Video.232 For Scalia, statutory interpretation, especially in
228. Gendron, 18 F.3d at 958 (citation omitted). Interestingly, Breyer uses the
same Tegucigalpa, Honduras example in Flores-Figueroa. Flores-Figueroa, 129
S. Ct. at 1890 (“Suppose Smith mails his bank draft to Tegucigalpa, which . . . is
the capital of Honduras.”).
229.

See Gendron, 18 F.3d at 958.

230. Flores-Figueroa, 129 S. Ct. at 1894 (Scalia, J., concurring in part &
concurring in the judgment).
231. Id. at 1894-95 (Scalia, J., concurring in part & concurring in the
judgment).
232. Scalia’s disagreement is with the use of legal principles to expand the
meaning of the text:
[T]he Court relies in part on the principle that “courts ordinarily
read a phrase in a criminal statute that introduces the elements of
a crime with the word ‘knowingly’ as applying that word to each
element.” If that is meant purely as a description of what most
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the context of criminal statutes, should be strictly limited to
the meaning of the text itself.
The strict textual plain meaning approach may be
appropriate for use in criminal statutes, but it still has the
possibility of leading to absurd and unintended results if
applied too mechanically. Although it involved a civil rather
than a criminal statute, United States v. Locke233 is perhaps
the best example of this danger. In Locke, the statute at
issue required that the claimant of an unpatented mining
claim file an intention to hold their claim “prior to
December 31 of each year” or the claim would be deemed
abandoned.234 The plaintiffs in the case filed their
paperwork on December 31st—one day too late—and lost
their claim worth several million dollars after it was
declared abandoned.235 The plaintiffs argued that the term
“prior to December 31 of each year” was ordinarily
understood to mean by the end of the calendar year, but the
Supreme Court was unwilling to go beyond the literal words
of the statute.236 Instead, the Court found that “with respect
to filing deadlines a literal reading of Congress’ words is
generally the only proper reading of those words.”237 The
Court refused to “soften the clear import of Congress’ chosen
words” to avoid the admittedly harsh result because to do so
would “take the courts out of the realm of interpretation
and place them in the domain of legislation.”238 Although
Justice Scalia was not yet a member of the Supreme Court
cases do, it is perhaps true, and perhaps not. I have not canvassed
all the cases and am hence agnostic. If it is meant, however, as a
normative description of what courts should ordinarily do when
interpreting such statutes—and the reference to JUSTICE
STEVENS’ concurring opinion in [X-Citement Video] suggests as
much—then I surely do not agree. The structure of the text in XCitement Video plainly separated the “use of a minor” element
from the “knowingly” requirement, wherefore I thought (and
think) that case was wrongly decided.
Flores-Figueroa, 129 S. Ct. at 1894 (Scalia, J., concurring in part & concurring
in the judgment).
233. 471 U.S. 84 (1985).
234. Id. at 89.
235. Id.
236. Id. at 93.
237. Id.
238. Id. at 95-96.
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when Locke was decided, it remains a possibility that the
mechanical and inflexible application of the strict textual
plain meaning approach will lead to unduly harsh and
absurd results.239
3. Justice Alito’s Concurrence. Justice Alito’s opinion is
perhaps the most interesting of the three not only due to his
unique approach to the issue, but also because it is one of
the first glimpses into the relatively new justice’s approach
to statutory interpretation. Alito seems to advocate a more
traditional, context-sensitive approach that de-emphasizes
the importance of ordinary English usage.
Alito, like Scalia, is concerned that the majority opinion
“will be cited for the proposition that the mens rea of a
federal criminal statute nearly always applies to every
element of the offense.”240 However, he also says that “[i]n
interpreting a criminal statute such as the one before us, . .
. it is fair to begin with a general presumption that the
specified mens rea applies to all the elements of an
offense.”241 Although these two statements appear to be
contradictory, it is possible that Alito intends the phrase
“such as the one before us” to mean something like where
the grammatical reading of the statute supports such an
interpretation.242 In such a case, it would be reasonable to
start with this as the base presumption, but where the
statute did not grammatically apply the mens rea
requirement to an element, starting with this base
presumption would be inappropriate.
In either situation, Alito stresses that “there are
instances in which context may well rebut that
presumption.”243 For Alito, context is more important than
239. See United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 82 (1994)
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (“I have been willing, in the case of civil statutes, to
acknowledge a doctrine of ‘scrivener’s error’ that permits a court to give unusual
(though not unheard-of) meaning to a word which, if given its normal meaning,
would produce an absurd and arguably unconstitutional result.”).
240. Flores-Figueroa, 129 S. Ct. at 1895 (Alito, J., concurring in part &
concurring in judgment).
241. Id.
242. Id. Alito’s use of the example sentence, “The mugger knowingly assaulted
two people in the park—an employee of company X and a jogger from town Y,”
suggests that this reading may be correct because it is grammatically dissimilar
from the text of § 1028A(a)(1). See id.
243. Id. at 1895.
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ordinary usage. Thus, in a grammatically indistinguishable
statute involving the sexual exploitation of minors, Alito is
comfortable rebutting the mens rea presumption to make
knowledge of the victim’s age irrelevant to the crime.244 This
is likely due to the oft expressed congressional intent that
minors require special protection from sexual exploitation.245
This is certainly the position that the Seventh Circuit Court
of Appeals took in United States v. Cox,246 one of the first
decisions discussing Flores-Figueroa. Facing a grammatical
statutory challenge similar to Flores-Figueroa, the court in
Cox found that the sexual exploitation of minors presented a
“special context” justifying a departure from the
grammatical plain meaning of the statute, and it cited
Alito’s concurrence as “perhaps calling for” such a
departure.247 It will be interesting to see if Alito’s hybrid
presumption/contextual
approach
to
statutory
interpretation gains any more adherents among the circuit
courts.248
CONCLUSION
Although they followed different paths in the search for
plain meaning, each of the Supreme Court opinions reached
the correct result in Flores-Figueroa. It is important to note
that even though Flores-Figueroa won his appeal, he will
not be going free any time soon. He will still face jail time
for his two predicate offenses, entering the United States
without inspection and misusing immigration documents.
The practical effect of this decision will be to take away one
tool that prosecutors once had to force quick plea bargains
and deportation onto illegal immigrants. However, the
government could still secure a conviction of FloresFigueroa under § 1028A(a)(1) if it could prove that he knew
the identification documents belonged to another person. In
244. Id. at 1895-96.
245. Id.; see, e.g., United States v. Taylor, 239 F.3d 994, 997 (2001).
246. 577 F.3d 833, 837 (7th Cir. 2009).
247. Id. at 838.
248. See Am. Acad. of Religion v. Napolitano, 573 F.3d 115, 131 (2d Cir. 2009)
(citing Alito’s concurrence as authorizing a departure from the “normal
approach” of the majority opinion in Flores-Figueroa and finding that the
statute at issue involved a special context).
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several of the cases considered in this Comment, such as
Miranda-Lopez
where
the
defendant
purchased
identification documents with another person’s picture on
them, the government would likely be able to meet this
higher burden of proof. But the most important impact of
the decision may be its potential effects on the search for a
statute’s plain meaning.
Most of the circuit court opinions interpreting
§ 1028A(a)(1) required an ambiguity in the statute to resort
to extra-textual sources for interpretation.249 In contrast,
neither the majority opinion nor Alito’s concurrence seem to
require textual ambiguity and instead emphasize analyzing
the context of a statute. Both also imply or state that special
contexts can justify a departure from the unambiguous
plain meaning of a criminal statute. Thus far, it appears
that Alito’s approach to statutory interpretation is being
employed by at least two of the circuits, and both have
found special contexts justifying departure from the plain
meaning of a statute’s text. Construing the unambiguous
textual commands of a criminal statute against a defendant
seems to violate the principles of fairness and notice
inherent in the rule of lenity. Although it is too early to tell
if this is the way this approach will be used, the possibility
for harsh and unfair results remains.
This possible danger leads to the conclusion that a strict
plain meaning approach would be most appropriate in the
context of unambiguous criminal statutes. However, this
recommendation comes with the caveat that absurd results,
such as resulted in Cox and would have resulted in XCitement Video, should be avoided. In civil statutes or
ambiguous criminal statutes, a more contextual approach is
necessary to effectuate a statutes plain meaning.
Regardless of the approach taken, courts would do well to
remain mindful of the target audience of a statute when
249. See United States v. Godin, 534 F.3d 51, 56 (1st Cir. 2008) (“Our
interpretive task begins with the statute’s text. We look to the plain meaning of
the words . . . .’” (citation omitted)); United States v. Mendoza-Gonzalez, 520
F.3d 912, 914 (8th Cir. 2008) (“In interpreting a statute we first ‘determine
whether the language at issue has a plain and unambiguous meaning with
regard to the particular dispute in the case.’ If so, we apply the plain language
of the statute.” (citation omitted) (quoting Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S.
337, 340 (1997))); United States v. Villanueva-Sotelo, 515 F.3d 1234, 1237 (D.C.
Cir. 2008) (“We must first ‘determine whether the language at issue has a plain
and unambiguous meaning . . . .’” (quoting Robinson, 519 U.S. at 340)).
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determining plain meaning. If it turns out that the result
reached was not the intended meaning of the statute, the
true intent of Congress can be made plain through
amendment easily enough.

